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Proof of Proposition 5 – Comparative Statics Results 
With a uniform distribution of types  () H   , and thus in the uncovered market when both GM and 
non-GM products are produced, market demands are, respectively,  ˆ
g D    and  ˆ
n D    , so that total 
demand is  T n g D D D      . Upon recalling the arbitrage relations of competitive equilibrium, that is, 
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In what follows we simplify notation and omit the functional dependence on  R  by writing  () F R F  , 
() f R f   and  () s R s  . Also, we define k  , 
0
g A u p     , and 
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  . 
  Aggregate consumer surplus here is 
22 1 ˆ (1 )
2
CS a s s      








          














          




     
where  () P   is producer surplus. The optimality conditions for welfare maximization (yielding the 
optimal standard purity 
* R  and the competitive farm-level equilibrium price 
* P ) are 
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Upon substitution and simplification we obtain 
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   . 
Consider now the comparative statics effect of the parameter k  . Differentiating the optimality 
conditions in (1) and (2) and expressing the results in matrix form yields 
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. 
Solving by Cramer’s rule obtains 
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   ,   0 RR W    and  0 PP W    by the second-order conditions of the welfare 
optimization problem (saddle point).    3 
  We now compute the partial effects that enter these comparative statics expressions. 
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which can be simplified to  
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 . 
Evaluating this partial effect at the optimality conditions, such that (3) holds, we obtain 
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And differentiating (2) we obtain 
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Thus, a sufficient condition for  0 kR W   is  (1 ) ( ) R s s R s    , which does hold because Rs   and 
1 R  . Hence, we conclude that  0 kR W  .  
The foregoing partial effects allow us to sign the comparative statics effect on farm price: 
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But      k Rk PP Pk RP sign R sign W W W W  . Note that 
0 1
() PP g Wp
as
    . 
Because 
00 ( ) ( ) 0 gg p S p       (the profit function is convex) and  0 Rk W  , to conclude that  0 k R   it 
suffices to show that 
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which can be simplified to yield 
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and so we can conclude that  0 k R  . Recalling that k  , we have therefore established parts (i) and 
(ii) of Proposition 4.  
The comparative statics analysis for the parameter k  is readily adapted to the comparative statics 
of the “GM aversion” parameter a . Specifically, 
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The partial effects of interest here are 
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which establishes part (iii) of Proposition 4. 
Finally, concerning the parameters u and  , we note that they enter the problem only through 
the term 
0
g A u p     . For the comparative statics of this term we have 
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and  0 RA W   because  RA PR WW   and we showed earlier that  0 PR W  . Thus we can immediately 
conclude that  0 A P  . The sign of  A R  is the sign of     RA PP PA RP Z W W W W . By using  RA PR WW   
we find    RA PP PA Z W W W  , and by noting that 
0 () PP g PA W p W      we get  
0 ( ) 0 RA g Z W p     , and 
so we conclude that  0 A R  . Recalling again that 
0
g A u p     , this concludes the comparative statics 
of parameters u and   (part (iv) of Proposition 5).   ■ 